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FOREIGN BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES

I. INTRODUCTION

Banking serves an increasingly important function in international
trade. As a matter of business procedure, many businessmen engaged
in international commercial transactions prefer to work through their
home-country bank. Consequently, banks often attempt to locate
facilities in other countries where their customers are engaged in trade.
If a bank is denied entry, the government of the rebuffed bank may
take measures against the rebuffing country's banks. In the United
States, this situation is complicated because state governments,'
rather than the federal government, 2 generally control the establishment of facilities by foreign banks.' As the volume of world trade has
increased, the lack of uniform regulation of foreign banking at the
federal level has become an obstacle to the financing of trade with the
United States. Concurrently, American exports depend on the
1. See Gilbert, Foreign Banking in the United States, 15 SAIs REv. 20
(1971).
2. See J. ZWICK, FOREIGN BANKING IN THE UNITED STATES, JOINT
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. PAPER No. 9, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966); 111

CONG. REc. 20,528 (1966) (remarks of Senator Javits). It should be noted that
the federal government, through the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act, has some
effect on the operations of foreign banks. See also MacKenzie & MacKenzie,
Penetration of the United States Market by a Foreign Bank, 6 INT'L LAW. 876
(1972).
3. If a foreign bank is permitted to establish a facility, it is immediately
confronted by state, and possibly federal, banking regulations. Federal deposit
insurance, for instance, has been made a condition to receiving deposits in
California.
When approaching the subject of foreign banking, it is helpful to understand
something of the history of banking regulations in the United States. For a more
detailed treatment of the growth of banking and bank regulation, see Hackley,
Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 771 (1966).
The National Currency Act of 1863 allowed banks to issue bank notes secured
by government bonds. Act of February 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. The 1863
Act also established, within the Treasury Department, the Comptroller of the
Currency, who executes all laws concerning the issuance and regulation of
national currency and approves national bank organizations. Later, Congress
attempted to drive state banks out of existence by enabling state banks to convert
their state charters to national charters. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 44, 13
Stat. 112. In 1865, Congress imposed a tax of ten per cent on the issuance of state
bank notes in an effort to accelerate the conversion of state charters to federal
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ones. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78, § 6, 13 Stat. 484. Consequently, state bank
issues declined markedly and the number of state banks dwindled temporarily,
but state banks soon countered congressional efforts by obtaining funds through
the receipt of deposits in lieu of the issuance of notes. Since the Civil War, the
national and state banking structures have coexisted as a "dual banking system."
This dual system, which evolved in an ad hoc manner, is characterized by an
unjustifiable overlap of administration and duplication of effort. See Hackley, Our
DiscriminatoryBanking Structure, 55 VA. L. REV. 1421 (1969).
Later legislation has affected both federal and state banking. In 1913, Congress
enacted the Federal Reserve Act, which established twelve regional Federal
Reserve Banks supervised by a Federal Reserve Board. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913)
(codified in 31 U.S.C. § 409 and in various sections of 12 U.S.C.). National banks
are required to purchase stock of the regional reserve banks, while state member
banks may do so voluntarily. The Act also imposes reserve requirements and
purchase, withdrawal and lending limits on member banks. Pursuant to tie Act,
the Federal Reserve Board regulates: branching of state member banks (12 U.S.C.
§ 321 (1970)); interest payments on deposits by member banks (12 U.S.C. §
371b (1970) ); interlocking directorates (15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970) ); foreign banking
operations by American banks (12 U.S.C. § 601 (1970) ); mergers (12 U.S.C. §
1828(c) (1970) ); and bank holding company transactions (12 U.S.C. § § 1842-43
(1970)).
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), created by the Banking
Act of 1933, offers insurance to state and federal banks desiring it. Ch. 89, 48
Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15 & 39 U.S.C.). The FDIC
regulates the deposit interest paid by insured banks that do not belong to the
Federal Reserve System (12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (1970)), the establishment of
branches (12 U.S.C. § 1828(d) (1970) ), and bank mergers (12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)
(1970)). Obviously, the FDIC's duties overlap the responsibilities of the Federal
Reserve Board, the Comptroller, and possibly the states.
Several other federal statutes also have had sufficient impact on banking in the
United States to merit attention. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
empowered the Federal Reserve Board to control the amount of credit that can be
extended to purchasers of registered securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970). The 1956
Bank Holding Company Act was passed to discourage the purchase of smaller
banks by larger bank holding companies. 12 U.S.C. § § 1841.48 (1970).
Finally, the relation of federal laws to state laws should be mentioned. A bank
may choose to be chartered either by the state or by the federal government.
State regulations concerning minimum capital requirements and reserve requirements vary considerably; federal regulations generally are more stringent.
Moreover, branching laws have undergone recent modifications that affect all
types of banking: 12 U.S.C. § 36 authorizes a national bank, with the approval of
the Comptroller, to establish in-town branches if similar branches would be
"expressly authorized to state banks by the law of the state," and to establish
out-of-town branches if such branches are authorized by the laws of the state. The
Supreme Court, in First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252
(1966), held that state statutory branching limitations were adopted by federal
law and applied to national banks. It is now generally concluded that federal law
controls the definition of "national bank branch," but state law controls their
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establishment of American banking facilities in other countries.4 In
recent years, however, the establishment of American banks has met
resistance in other countries, which demand that their banks be
granted the reciprocal privilege of placing facilities in the United
States. The Japanese, for example, apparently view reciprocity as a
condition to further American banking in Japan.' Similarly, Canada
has restricted American banking activities on the ground that
Canadian banks have received comparable treatment in the State of
New York.6
The first half of this Note examines the evolution of foreign banking
in the United States, and the forms it has taken in response to the
regulations imposed by state and federal governments. The remainder
of the note advocates that the federal government assume exclusive
control over foreign banking in this country.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIGN BANKING
7
IN THE UNITED STATES

The volume of foreign banking in the United States relates directly
to the volume of foreign trade transacted in this country. Prior to
World War I, therefore, few foreign banks were established in the
United States. The first to initiate foreign banking in the United States
were the Canadians, and the Japanese, who opened facilities in
California during the 1870's; by the turn of the century, foreign bank
facilities also were located in Oregon and Washington. In 1906,
establishment. See First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252
(1966); Dickinson v. First Nat'l Bank, 400 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'd on
other grounds, 396 U.S. 122 (1969). But cf. Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d
333 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970). For a summary of state
branching laws see Gup, A Review of State Laws on Branch Banking, 88 BANK.
L. J. 675 (1971).
For purposes of this note, it is significant that the many possible variations in
the banking laws inevitably affect foreign banks, which must comply with one or
more sets of state and/or federal laws.
4. "[C]orrespondent banking no longer meets the requirements of the
international corporation, which expects its bank to be present in the principal
countries of the world and to be able to serve it directly rather than indirectly."
Heldring, MultinationalBanking Strives for Identity, 3 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.

49, 50 (1968). Mr. Heldring was Senior Vice President of the Philadelphia National
Bank and in charge of international operations when this article was published.
5. See THE EcONOMIST, Jan. 27, 1972, at 64.
6. See Gilbert, supra note 1.
7. Much of the information contained in this section is taken from Gilbert,
supra note 1. Ms. Gilbert is currently a staff member of the International Division
in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
Vol. 6-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

Massachusetts enacted the first state legislation permitting foreign
banking activity, followed by Oregon in 1907. After passing a liberal
foreign banking statute in 1909, California restricted the trust
activities of foreign banks in 1913, and circumscribed foreign banks
still further in 1917 by prohibiting their receipt of deposits. During
World War I, foreign banking activity was also restricted in Washington. Restrictive state laws remained in effect after World War I, and
the 1930's witnessed further curtailment of foreign commerce, with
consequent diminution of related foreign financing activity. Shortly
after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the California banking department
seized and liquidated three Japanese banks. In February 1942, the
Comptroller of the Currency supervised liquidation of other Japanese
banks located in Hawaii and Seattle, Washington. Following World
War II, however, the infusion of economic assistance into Western
Europe and Japan, coupled with the increase in international trade,
produced a growing need for international banking activity. United
States banking institutions responded to the need by opening offices
in many foreign countries, and foreign banks located offices in the
principal financial markets of the United States-New York, San
Francisco and Chicago. The number of United States bank facilities in
foreign countries has increased dramatically with the rise in foreign
trade and foreign investment.8
Foreign banking within the United States likewise has enjoyed
steady expansion after some states, most notably New York and
California, relaxed their legislation restricting foreign banking. The
legislative changes apparently resulted from substantial resistance to
American banking activity abroad, which derived from the states'
failure to accord reciprocity to foreign banking institutions.9 By the
late 1950's, the United States dollar had become the preeminent
world currency, and the European central banks were accumulating
substantial dollar accounts-both assets and liabilities-in New York
and other American financial centers!' International banks apparently believed facilities in the United States were necessary to avoid

8. "At the end of 1955, there were 111 foreign branches of U.S. banks in
operation. Ten years later, this number had almost doubled. With 51 new
branches opened in 1967, the total number of overseas branches at the end of
March 1968 [had] risen to 308." Heldring, supra note 4, at 50.
9. "It was not until a few U.S. banks had begun to encounter resistance to
their overseas expansion programs during the late 1950's that the issue of
permitting foreign banks to branch in New York was raised again." J. ZwicK,
supra note 2, at 2. See also THE EcONOMIST, supra note 5, at 64.
10. J. ZwicK, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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becoming merely regional banks, rather than enjoying full participation in the increasing world trade financing."
Between 1946 and 1960, the majority of foreign banking facilities
established in the United States were either representative offices or
agencies. 2 In 1959, the State of New York, at the behest of leading
New York banks, drafted legislation to permit foreign branches to
receive deposits and exercise specified fiduciary powers. 3 In 1964,
California also authorized foreign bank branching, but required
foreign branches to obtain insurance from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC)--an impossibility for foreign branches.' 4 Since 1968, foreign bank agencies in California have been
allowed to receive deposits originating in foreign countries without
first obtaining FDIC insurance, and California recently authorized
foreign branches to accept deposits. Although the acceptance of
deposits by agencies is still subject to the impracticable procurement
of FDIC insurance,' subsidiaries, which are allowed to engage in a
broad scope of activities, can obtain FDIC insurance and thus meet
the state's condition to receiving deposits.'
At the end of 1971, seven states permitted foreign agencies or
facilities;' 7 eight states prohibited foreign banking altogether' 8 five
11. California and New York were more conducive to foreign banking than
other states because each had a great deal to gain in the financing of trade, and
conversely, a great deal to lose if their financial institutions were barred from
banking in other countries because of lack of United States reciprocity. See
generally J. ZwicK, supra note 2, at 2-4.
12. For a more complete description of the various forms of facilities see
MacKenzie & MacKenzie, infra note 21.
13. N.Y. BANK. LAW § 202-a (McKinney 1971). "The need to alleviate
present discrimination, lessen the possibility of retaliation, and increase New
York's prestige as an international financial center were the major arguments used
to support the bill.... However, the law and supervisory procedure require that
reciprocity be granted New York banks. A 1968 amendment provided for
indefinite licenses after ten years of operations." Gilbert, supra note 1, at 22.
14. See generally 12 U.S.C. § § 1811-31 (1970). Gilbert notes that FDIC
insurance requirements imposed by California have kept the state closed to
foreign branches, but foreign facilities other than branches are allowed. Gilbert,
supra note 1, at 22.
15. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1756-56.1 (West 1958). Oregon also makes FDIC
insurance a precondition to acceptance of deposits. OREGON REv. STAT. §
713.010 (1971).
16. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 25. Since a subsidiary must be incorporated
by the State of Califomia, even though the stockholders may be outside the state,
it is not foreign. See generally CAL. FIN. CODE § § 1750 et seq.
17. Alaska, California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon and Washington. Gilbert, supra note 1, at 23.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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states expressly prohibited foreign branches;' 9 and other states either
had no laws specifically regulating foreign banking or referred to it
only tangentially.2 Despite this variety of state-imposed restrictions,
foreign banking in the United States is expanding.
III.

FORMS AND ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN BANKING
IN THE UNITED STATES

Often, foreign banking institutions have insufficient direct contact
with local commerce to establish a local identity. Without local
identity, the activity is in the nature of foreign commerce and the
foreign bank need not qualify to do business under local law.2 ' If,
TABLE 1*

Offices of Foreign Banks in the United States by Type of Office and by State(a)
Foreign banking offices
Agencies
California

Branches

11

StateRepresentative chartered
offices
subsidiaries
7

7

6

1

62

6

Illinois
New York
Oregon

24

23

Branches of
State-chartered
subsidiaries
14

2

Texas

4

Washington

I

Puerto Rico

7

Virgin Islands

3

(b )

(a) No offices currently exist in Massachusetts and Hawaii although laws in these
States authorize foreign banking offices.
(b) Branch operates under grandfather clause.
*Source: J. ZWICK, supra note 2, at 31

18. Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New
Jersey and Ohio. Id.
19. Delaware, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Texas and Vermont. Id.

20. Id. Foreign banks were allowed to conduct business as foreign institutions
in six states-California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon and Washington. J. ZWICK, supra note 2, at 5 n.4. Of these six, only three-New York,
Massachusetts and Oregon-permit foreign banks to choose the form of banking
desired. Id. at 5.
21. MacKenzie & MacKenzie, Penetration of the United States Market by a
Foreign Bank, 6 INT'L LAW. 876, 878 (1972).
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however, the bank wishes to engage actively in local business, it may
choose one of several forms, according to the requirements of state
statutes. In order of increasing formality, these forms are: (1)
representative offices; (2) agencies; (3) branches; and (4) partly-owned
or wholly-owned subsidiaries (see Table 1)22 Although many of the
activities performed by these four foreign bank facilities are similar,
several distinguishing characteristics should be noted. First, representative offices do not accept deposits; they merely inform the public
of the home bank's services. This minimum activity is insufficient to
require state supervision, and these offices are generally not registered
with the state. Agencies perform financing activities beyond the
advertising function of the representative office and must be licensed
by the state. An agency may hold assets, but is prohibited from
receiving deposits. Because state citizens do not establish checking
accounts with the agencies, the states do not subject them to extensive
examinations. Branches, located primarily in New York, must be
licensed by the state and are required to undergo stringent examinations since they may receive deposits. The branch is not, however, a
legal entity separate from the parent institution. The subsidiary, on
the other hand, is an entity incorporated by the licensing state but
owned wholly or in part by aliens. Subsidiaries are subjected to the
most rigorous state inspections and are frequently required to have
American directors. In addition, a few international financing companies have been chartered under the New York State Investment
Company Act.3 Because of their limited nature, these companies will
not be discussed in this Note.
A.

Representative Offices

Over one-hundred representative offices are presently open in the
United States.' Their principal functions are to disseminate informa-

22. See MacKenzie & MacKenzie, supra note 21, at 878-79.
23. "Essentially, these international banks finance high-risk trade and participate in venture capital schemes, especially in Latin America.... Because of their
expertise, they have been in a position to promote and finance the exports of
small and often unknown firms. These firms have also provided nonrecourse
financing to credit-worthy exporters. Finally, [these] companies have offered
advice and direct financing to firms who are establishing marketing or franchised
distribution networks for their products in foreign markets. Offering these
services, which few domestic or foreign banks are willing to provide, the
investment companies have expanded the scope of the financial community's
services to international businesses." J. ZwIcK, supra note 2, at 9-10.
24. "There were 79 offices in 1966, 78 in 1968, 103 in 1969, and 117 in
1970. Of these [as of 1970], 14 are in Los Angeles, 5 in San Francisco, 3 in the
Vol. 6-No. 2
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tion about the parent bank and to encourage relations with American
customers. Since these offices may not perform any active banking
functions, they are generally not subject to state supervision?' It may
often be difficult, however, to determine whether passive functions
have evolved into active ones. For example, if a representative office
accepts a check from a local citizen for deposit with the parent bank
abroad, it may be argued that forwarding the sum to the home office
is a mere convenience to the parent and not an active local banking
function. Conversely, it may be claimed that this activity is an active
banking transaction, since the deposit was received and acknowledged
locally, and since the parent, in turn, often remits the amount to the
American office to be held there as a credit due the parent. Similarly,
it might be argued that an active banking function has occurred when
a representative presents the foreign parent's loan agreement to the
local customer for his signature and then returns the document to the
26
home office.
Questions about representative office activities have recently been
raised in California. California's Attorney General has considered
whether advertising could be done only by a licensed foreign bank
facility and has concluded that advertising, via direct mail or public
journal, for foreign deposits constitutes improper banking business for
an unlicensed foreign bank office. 2" He has also indicated that
acceptance of money in the state for transmission for deposit abroad,
is the initial procedure in taking deposits. 28 Thus California, along
with several other states, is attempting to regulate the activities of
representatives by limiting the functions that unlicensed offices may
perform.2 9

District of Columbia, 10 in Chicago, 1 in Pittsburgh, 2 in Dallas, 4 in Houston,
and ...78 in New York City. Banks from almost every major nation, including
Yugoslavia, have at least 1 representative office." Gilbert, supra note 1, at 24.
25. J. ZWICK, supra note 2, at 8. California, however, does exert some
supervision by requiring the representative offices to obtain a license. Gilbert,
supra note 1, at 24.
26. MacKenzie & MacKenzie, supra note 21, at 884.
27. MacKenzie indicates that the California Attorney General concluded that
mere institutional advertising was not improper. Id. at 885.
28. MacKenzie, supra note 21, at 884. California has now enacted legislation
that may clarify these vague areas. See CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 1756-56.2 (West
1968).
29. CAL. FIN. CODE § § 1750 et seq. (West 1968).
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FOREIGNBANKING IN THE UNITED STA TES

B. Agencies
Foreign bank agencies, which must be licensed by the state, play a
prominent role in international trade and in the money markets. They
hold substantial amounts of domestic assets (see Table 2), even though
prohibited from receiving deposits subject to withdrawal, and have
supplied significant funds to the federal government?' Agency trade
financing activities pertain mainly to transactions between the United
States and the home country; they include issuing letters of credit and
buying, selling, collecting and paying bills of exchange'
TABLE

2*

Agencies of Foreign Banks
New York
Dec. 1968

New York
Dec. 1969

California
June 1969

California
June 1970

ASSETS
Total assets

$5,327,220,000

$6,646,040,000

$570,417,830

$780,808,952

2,204,405,000

3,212,872,000

267,485,552

398,517,978

705,409,000

871,704,000

261,240,144

339,874,295

Due to own
head office
and branches $4,120,853,000
a
Deposits( )
-

$5,064,528,000

$169,818,060

$188,988,190

Loans
Customers'
liabilities
on
acceptances
LIABILITIES

Acceptances
outstanding(b)

325,543,000

434,730,000

261,240,144

1,660,323
339,874,295

(a) California agencies were permitted to accept foreign deposits in November
1969. These data represent two agencies.
(b) Excludes acceptances held for account of head offices and branches. These
data were the composite of 27 agencies in New York and 14 agencies in
California.
*Source: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS 201
(released Dec. 31, 1968); Superintendent of Banks, State of California, Annual
Report, 1969, at 185-92, 201-06.

30. See Brimmer, Foreign Banking Institutions in the United States Money
Market, 44 REV. EcON. & STATISTICS 76 (1962).
31. See J. ZWICK, supra note 2, at 13.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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The impact of foreign bank agencies on the United States should
not be overlooked. In 1965, for example, 27 New York agencies
reported total assets of over 4 billion dollars.32 By 1969, this figure
had grown to over 6.5 billion dollars,3 3 and at the end of 1971, 28
agencies reported total assets of 8.1 billion dollars (see Table 3). Of

TABLE

3*

Condensed Statements of Condition of New York Agencies
and Branches of Foreign Banking Corporations
(unit: thousands of dollars)
Agencies

Dec. 31, 1971

Dec. 31, 1970

Dec. 31, 1969

28

28

28

$1,209,725

$1,534,618

$1,016,491

418,712

698,543

741,999

3,458,488

3,317,649

3,212,872

Number of Agencies
ASSETS
Cash and balances with other banks
Bonds and corporate stocks
Loans and overdrafts

870,902

1,133,543

871,704

1,733,967

1,434.213

543,161

418,336

222,145

259,813

$8,110,130

$8,340,711

$6,646.040

$

$

$

Customers' liabilities on acceptances
Due from own head office and branches
Other assets
TOTAL

LIABILITIES
Due to foreign banks

384,545

367,934

333,637

Due to customers and other banks

319,024

338,826

268,218

Liabilities for borrowed money
Acceptances outstanding (a)

493,717

229,663

166,252

605,388

699.175

434,730

Other liabilities

920,821

480,126

378,675

$2,723,495

$2,115,724

$1,581,512

5,386,635

6,224,987

5,064,528

$8,110.130

$8,340,711

$6,646,040

Total liabilities exclusive of amounts
due to own head offices and branches
Due to own head offices and branches
TOTAL

(a) Excludes acceptances held for account-of-head-offices and branches.
*Source: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS,
PT. 9 (released Dec. 31, 1971).

SCH.

A,

32. Id.
33. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 26.
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the 1971 total, approximately 3.4 billion dollars was held in the form
of loans and overdrafts, 1.2 billion dollars was held as cash and
balances with other banks and 1.7 billion dollars was listed as "due
from own head office and branches." The largest single reported
liability was that "due to own head offices and branches"-5.38
billion dollars. The latter amount often represents sums either received
for the home office, or deposited first with the home office then
transferred to the agency for holding. It has been argued that this
procedure is merely a method of avoiding state regulations prohibiting
34
deposit solicitations by agencies.
Japanese and Canadian banks conduct the most extensive agency
banking activity in the United States. The Japanese have established
numerous agencies to facilitate the financing of vast trading activities;
they apparently consider the agency a more desirable mode of
operation than the branch, since statutory restrictions on agencies are
less rigorous than those applied to other banking forms.3 ' For
example, fractional reserve requirements do not apply to agencies, nor
are agencies required to restrict individual customer loans to ten per
cent of the parent bank's capital. Furthermore, assets of agencies in
New York must exceed liabilities by only 100 per cent rather than by
the 108 per cent required of branches. 6 Under the assumption that
the protection of depositors is unnecessary for agencies, agency
examinations generally are restricted to a peripheral survey of asset
7
quality and composition to insure that capital requirements are met2
Canadian agencies in New York, unlike the Japanese agencies, have
actively financed trade between third countries. 38 The Canadian
agencies, whose holdings account for approximately one-half the total
agency assets in New York, 39 have dealt actively in street loans-loans
to brokers and dealers--and have participated in interest rate arbitrage
and the lending of Eurodollars. 4' The growth of foreign bank agencies

34. See J. ZWIcK, supra note 2, at 14.
35. Fourteen of 35 agencies in the United States in 1966 were affiliated with
Japanese banks. At least 80% of Japanese loans in 1966 were short-term and were
used to implement import and export transactions. J. ZWICK, supra note 2, at 13.
36. Id. at 7.
37. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 26.
38. See J. ZwICK, supra note 2, at 14.
39. Id. Canadian agency assets are substantial primarily "because of the bond
flotations of Canadian provinces and municipalities which are free from the
interest equalization tax.. . ." Gilbert, supra note 1, at 27.
40. Eurodollars are United States currencies held outside the United States.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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appears to have slowed somewhat in recent years,4 1 though their
control of domestic assets remains more than merely nominal.
C. Branches
Foreign bank branches must be licensed by the state and must
undergo regular examinations more stringent than those imposed on
agencies. Branch banks provide all services necessary for trade
financing, including letters of credit, discounts, acceptances, collections, foreign exchange transfers of funds and remittances. In addition
to financing trade,4 2 branches actively engage in fund investments,
commerceial and personal lending and deposit solicitation. Branches
service the home bank's customers, thereby enabling the foreign bank
to handle the complete business transaction.
Branches may be preferable to the subsidiary form for several
reasons: first, the organizational structure is less complicated; secondly, there is no necessity to maintain either American directors or
American shareholders, as is sometimes required in the subsidiary
form; thirdly, capital requirements are less stringent; and fourthly,
loan limits for branches generally will be higher since limits are
calculated on the basis of the parent bank's reported capital.4 3 A
major advantage may be the immediate enjoyment by the branch of
the goodwill developed by the international parent bank.
Branches, however, may have disadvantages that must be weighed
by the foreign institution contemplating expansion into the United
States. The parent bank may find detrimental the increased cost of
renting, staffing and maintaining a banking facility that is more
elaborate than other banking forms and more closely scrutinized than
the less formal types. In addition, New York, where branches are
principally deployed, requires the foreign bank to elect between a
branch and an agency, since those two forms cannot be used
simultaneously in that state.4 4

41. "In 1965, there were twenty-seven agencies; in 1966 there were
thirty-five; in 1967 there were thirty-eight; in 1969 there were forty-one. None
have been established since then. Agencies [as of 1971] are located in California
(13), New York (26), Washington (1), and Hawaii (1)." Gilbert, supra note 1, at
26.
42. In 1966 it was estimated that more than 50% of branch loans and
discounts related to foreign trade transactions. J. ZwicK, supra note 2, at 10.
43. Id. at 5-6.
44. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 29. A 1966 report to the Joint Economic
Committee listed five requirements for the establishment of a foreign bank branch
in New York: "(1) Evidence must be provided that the applicant's home nation
Spring, 1973
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The number of branches in the United States has been increasing
yearly, from 36 branches in 1966 to 59 in 1970, 38 of which were
located in New York.4" The financing of trade remains their major
function but retail depositors oftenI rely on the foreign branches' more
complete services.

D. Subsidiaries
Subsidiaries-state-chartered banking corporations owned by the
foreign parent--are established primarily to perform trust activities or
to participate in a full spectrum of retail and wholesale banking.46
Foreign branches cannot receive FDIC insurance, and, therefore, are
prevented from accepting deposits in California.47 But since subsidiaries are eligible for FDIC insurance, foreign banks wishing to
conduct retail activities in California have favored the use of this
banking form.4 8 Foreign subsidiaries located in New York exist
primarily to perform trust functions. Canadian subsidiaries have not
been well received recently by New York authorities because of
Canada's failure to give New York banks free access to the Canadian
banking market. The Canadian subsidiaries presently conduct business
in this country primarily to complement their parents' activity.49

does not prohibit the operation of branches or agencies by New York banks. (2)
The Superintendent must be convinced that the foreign branch 'will be honestly
and efficiently conducted and that public convenience and advantage will be
promoted.' (3) A guarantee fund composed of cash and/or securities equivalent to
5 percent of liabilities (but not less than $100,000) must be deposited by the
prospective foreign branch in an approved New York bank. (4) The parent bank
must have capital funds of at least $1 million to be eligible for a branch license,
which amount is higher than requirements for establishing a subsidiary, or even a
domestic bank. (5) A license must be obtained from the Superintendent of Banks
subsequent to affirmative evaluation of the branch application by the State
banking board." J. ZwicK, supra note 2, at 5. California has similar requirements.
See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 29. In addition, foreign branch licenses in New York
must be renewed annually, assets must be maintained in that state equal to 108%
of liabilities, and weekly condition reports must be submitted. J. ZwICK, supra
note 2, at 6.
45. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 29. New York statistics furnished by the New
York State Superintendent of Banking.
46. J. ZwicK, supra note 2, at 9.
47. CAL. FIN. CODE § 3516 (West 1968).
48. See J. ZWICK, supra note 2, at 9.

49. Id.
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IV.

HOLDING COMPANY PROVISIONS

The federal government through the Federal Reserve Board
maintains control over foreign banking activities in the United States
that come within the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act
and its amendments."0 In addition, regulations have been promulgated
that define the limits of permissible foreign banking activity by
holding companies."
A consideration of the Bank Holding Company Act should begin
with underlying policy assumptions. First, Congress deemed it
desirable to prevent enterprises controlling banking activities from
becoming monopolies, considered disadvantageous to the American
economy.5s Secondly, Congress considered the affiliation of banking
with non-banking enterprises to be economically unhealthy, since
bank activities should be isolated from other commercial activities in
order to reduce speculation. Thirdly, banking outlets traditionally
have been kept within state borders.5 3 This limitation is probably the
result of efforts to maintain the dual banking system-state and
national banks-in its present competitive form.
To guard against monopolistic tendencies, Congress in 1956 enacted
the Bank Holding Company Act, which requires bank holding
companies: (1) to register pursuant to the Act; 4 (2) to divest control
of all nonbank related operations; 5 and (3) to submit to examinations by the Federal Reserve Board. 6 Until recently, a bank holding
company was statutorily defined as "any company (1) that directly or
indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote 25 per centum
or more of the voting shares of each of two or more banks or of a
company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this
chapter or (2) that controls ... the election of a majority of the
directors of each of two or more banks.. .""' When the 1956 Act was
passed, Congress discerned no need to extend the Act to companies
controlling only one bank. After 1966, however, many large banks
became affiliated with unregulated one-bank holding companies and
50. Act of May 9, 1956, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § § 1841-49 (1970). Much of
the analysis of the holding company provisions was taken from MacKenzie &
MacKenzie, supra note 21.
51. See note 63 infra.
52. See S. REP. No. 91-1084, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1970). See generally
MacKenzie & MacKenzie, supra note 21, at 879-80.
53. MacKenzie & MacKenzie, supra note 21, at 877-78.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(a) (1970).
55. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1970).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c) (1970).
57. Act of May 9, 1956, ch. 240, § 2(a).
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by 1970, an estimated 40 per cent of all bank deposits were controlled
by the one-bank holding companies-a four-fold increase in only three
years.5 8 This dramatic development prompted Congress to revise the
Act to bring the one-bank holding companies within its scope.
Specifically, Congress augmented the definition of holding company to include "any company which has control over any bank or
over any company that is or becomes a bank holding company by
virtue of this chapter." 9 In addition, the 1970 amendment"
established a presumption that companies controlling less than five per
cent of a bank's voting stock do not control the bank.'
The
amendment also requires any company planning either to acquire or
to form a controlled bank subsidiary to obtain the prior approval of
the Federal Reserve Board.6 2 Any foreign banking institution wishing
to maintain an American subsidiary is thus covered by the 1970
amendment.6
Foreign banks may be able to use the 1970 amendments to their
advantage. For example, the pre-1970 statute did not explicitly
prohibit wide geographical distribution of nonbank acquisitions,64
although bank acquisitions were prohibited. 65 Foreign banks, by
acquiring nonbank enterprises beyond state lines, could gain a market
66
area more expansive than that now available to United States banks.

58. See generally STAFF
CURRENCY,

91ST

CONG.,

REPORT OF HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND

1ST SEss., BANK HOLDING

COMPANY

ACT

AMENDMENTS (Comm. Print 1969).
59. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1970).
60. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (1970).
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(3) (1970).
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(2)-(3) (1970).
63. For the Federal Reserve Board regulations pertaining to foreign bank
holding companies, see 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(f)-(g). Among other things, the
regulations allow a foreign bank holding company performing one-half or more of
its business outside the United States to engage in nonbanking activities in this
country, if they are incidental to its outside activities. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(ii).
A foreign bank holding company also may engage directly in any kind of activities
outside the United States. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g)(2)(i).
64. Guenther, The 1970 Bank Holding Company Act Amendments and State
Influence on Banking Structure, 89 BANK. L.J. 318 (1972).
65. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1970).
66. If different geographical areas are penetrated, in unrelated activities, the
risk of antitrust actions should be reduced. See Guenther, supra note 64, at 327.
Mr. Guenther, who was Executive Vice President-Economist of the Conference of
State Bank Supervisors when he wrote his article, indicates that the 1970
amendment, as it related to nonbank acquisitions, implemented a public interest
test in 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1970) to determine the soundness of the acquisition.
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Furthermore, loan production offices can be strategically placed
throughout the country without violating the Act.6 7 Implementation
of such a design under the present statutory scheme could give foreign
banks a competitive advantage over other banking institutions. In this
way foreign banks conceivably might become the only "truly
American" banks.68
V.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING
STATE CONTROL OF FOREIGN BANKING

Historically, foreign banking has been regulated almost exclusively
by the states, but the important question is whether state control
should be allowed to continue. The remainder of this note attempts to
show that foreign banking is no longer a proper subject for state
control, but is more appropriately within the exclusive province of the
federal government.
A. Power of the Federal Government to Regulate ForeignBanking
1. Fiscal Powers. The power of the federal government to charter
national banks-as a necessary and proper incident of the sovereign's
jurisdiction over fiscal affairs 9 -was affirmed in McCulloch v. Maryland."° In addition, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to grant to the federal government all fiscal powers understood to
belong to sovereigns. 7 1 This broad authority is the result of both the
express constitutional grants and the implied powers derived from the
necessary and proper clause."2 McCulloch has been the basis for
upholding the Federal Reserve System," the Federal Land Bank
System, 4 and the FDIC." Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning in

67. See

FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN

682 (August 1968); Guenther,

supra note 64, at 324.

68. Some American banks fear that foreign banks will spread a network of
affiliates throughout the country and "become the 'only truly American' banks."
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 5, at 64-67.
69. See B.

SCHWARTZ,

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW,

A TEXTBOOK

§

46

Fiscal Powers (1972).
70. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
71. See, e.g., Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884): "Congress has the
power to issue the obligations of the United States in such form and to impress
upon them such qualities as currency for the purchase of merchandise and the
payment of debts, as accord with the usage of sovereign governments." 110 U.S.
at 447.
72. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 80.
73. See Hiatt v. United States, 4 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1924).
74. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
75. See Doherty v. United States, 94 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1938).
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McCulloch, when combined with the broad constitutional grant of
fiscal powers to the federal government, indicates that Congress has
"practically unlimited authority over every phase of currency." 7 6
Obviously, foreign banking facilities in the United States exert an
impact on the nation's monetary affairs7 7 that undoubtedly will
increase as international trade increases." For example, the ability of
foreign banks to transfer currency in and out of the United States may
reduce the effectiveness of certain federal monetary control devices.7 9
This point is illustrated by the practice of fund transfers employed
recently by large multinational banks headquartered in the United
States. In late 1969, the Federal Reserve maintained an interest rate
ceiling below market yields on time deposits. This ceiling resulted in a
shrinkage, or "run-off," of time deposits, which especially affected
certificates of deposits (CD's). Eurodollar (United States currency
held as assets abroad) borrowings during that period fluctuated in
direct relation to the changes in CD holdings. As CD run-off
continued, multinational banks increased the influx of Eurodollars to
replace funds lost through CD attrition; thus by borrowing Eurodollars, these large institutions delayed the effect of federally imposed
monetary restraints. The American financial system, as this illustration
suggests, may be influenced by international, as well as national,
financial developments.8 " This analysis applies equally to foreign

76. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 80.
77. Recent Reports of the Federal Reserve Board indicate that United States
assets of foreign banks operating here tripled from 1965 to 1972, and now total
about $13 billion. Concurrently, the amount of deposits held has increased. For
example, "liabilities due to customers and other banks [i.e. deposits]" totaled
$384 million for New York agencies, and $1 billion for New York branches.
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF BANKS, ScH. A, PT. 9
(released Dec. 31, 1971).
78. This country is currently pursuing a policy of expanding trade with other
countries. See The Trade Act of 1971: A Fundamental Change in United States
Foreign Trade Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1418, 1424-26 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Trade Act].
79. This analysis is based on a recent study by Mr. Andrew F. Brimmer,
(member, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System), which was presented
before a joint session of the Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American
Economic Association and the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the American
Finance Association. A. Brimmer, Multi-national Banks and the Management of
Monetary Policy in the United States (Dec. 28, 1972).
80. Id. at 1. Mr. Brimmer's statistical study concerns the economic effect that
multinational banks have on money flow. The thrust of his analysis is that either a
flexible use of reserve requirements based mainly on bank assets, or the flexible
use of investment tax credits, should be adopted to prevent multinational banks
Vol. 6-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

banks operating in the United States that can effect the transfer of
funds from country to country to avoid fixed interest rates or other
governmentally imposed monetary restraints. Clearly, lack of control
over foreign banks dilutes the effectiveness of national monetary
control efforts. Equally clear is that effective control of foreign banks
is possible only by the sovereign, not by subsidiary states.
Another aspect of national fiscal policy-the balance of payments--is directly affected by foreign banking activity in this country.
The funds that foreign banking institutions expend in this country to
establish branch facilities improve the United States balance of
payments. Moreover, since manufacturers establishing plants in the
United States may encourage their banks to place banking offices in
the United States for the manufacturer's convenience, a further
improvement in the balance of payments could be realized." Foreign
banking in the United States can improve the balance of payments in
other ways as well. Foreign banking activity in the United States
reduces the American balance of payments deficit by the excess of
deposits received over loans to borrowers outside the United States. 2
The impact of foreign banking on the United States balance of
payments is sufficient now to demand its regulation at the federal
level. As these banking activities continue to increase, the need for
federal control steadily will become more apparent.
2. Regulation of Commerce. Apart from its impact on American
fiscal policy, foreign banking comes within the aegis of the federal
government by reason of its effect on foreign commerce. The
Constitution expressly confers on Congress the power "To regulate

from freely moving funds across frontiers as interest rates fluctuate. See also Dahl,
International Operations of U.S. Banks: Growth and Public Policy Implications,
32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 100 (1967).
81. Devaluation of the dollar will have the effect of allowing foreign producers
to build new United States factories at a cost lower than before the devaluation.
Japan's Toyo Bearing Manufacturing Company, Ltd., and Sony Corp., are building
substantial factories in this country. The Sony plant, for instance, will cost $15
million and will produce 240,000 television sets annually. See generally J. Zw ICK,
supra note 2, at 19; TIM E,April 2, 1973, at 85.
82. J. ZwicK, supra note 2, at 19. Zwick notes that the balance of payments
is also improved "to the extent that these U.S. offices [of foreign banks] have
been successful in inducing foreign dollar-holders to convert liquid dollar holdings
into non-liquid investments." Furthermore, foreign banks stimulate the purchase
of American securities by foreign individuals, a function beneficial to the
American balance of payments. Id. at 19, 20.
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States...",,
This affirmative delegation of power to the federal government is
reinforced by constitutional "words of prohibition to the States
....
"84 Regretfully, however, the extent to which the commerce
clause forbids state action never has been delineated clearly.8" Rather,
the Court has developed various theories that attempt to describe the
federal-state relationship with respect to commerce.
For example, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
posited an expansive and dominant federal role on the theory that
commerce includes all "intercourse among the states." In Cooley v.
Board of Wardens,8" the Taney Court proposed a more functional
delineation of state and federal commerce: "Whatever subjects of
this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform
system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said8 to be of such a nature
as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."
A later test was whether the effect of state activity on commerce
was direct or indirect, only the latter being permissible.8 9 In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,90 however, the Court discarded the
direct-indirect standard and concluded that the essential issue was not
directness, but whether the state activity had an appreciable effect on
commerce.
More recently, it has been argued that two doctrines apply in the
area of foreign commerce. One is concerned solely with whether the
state-imposed burden is unreasonable or undue, regardless of local
interest. The second involves a balancing of the competing state and

84.

L.

HENKIN,

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

AND

THE

CONSTITUTION

234

(1972).
85. "[W]hat Congress might do under the Commerce clause is not ipso facto
forbidden to the States .... But the Supreme Court sometimes seemed to decide
what the States cannot do by asking what Congress can; and it denied power to
Congress to do what it could not bring itself to forbid to the States." Id. at 235 &
n.32.
86. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
87. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851). The Cooley
doctrine has been said to lose utility when the concern is not purely local or
purely national.
88. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
89. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (mining is not
commerce). See also B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 69, at 94-95.
90. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Regulation under the commerce clause, it should be
noted, is not dependent on the quantity of activity. See NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306
U.S. 601 (1939) (regulated industry must affect interstate commerce; but it need
not affect a large proportion of such commerce).
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national interests." The former test was applied in Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan,92 which involved a state statute limiting
the number of railroad cars that could be coupled to form a train.
Noting that federal legislation did not expressly preempt state power
to regulate, and that the purpose of Arizona's statute was to protect
the health and safety of resident citizens, the Court nevertheless found
the statute to be in contravention of the commerce clause.
Conceivably, state legislation limiting foreign banking might rest on
the state's power to protect its citizenry by safeguarding banking
activities. The Court in Southern Pacific, however, indicated that state
protection will not outweigh national interests in the free flow of
commerce, which certainly would suffer from restrictive state regulation of foreign banking activity. 3 If, as in Southern Pacific, state
statutes vary in their methods of regulating foreign banking, the
foreign banking institutions would face the almost impossible task of
interpreting and attempting to comply with disparate regulatory
schemes. The test embraced in Southern Pacific would find that the
state banking laws contravene the commerce clause and, therefore,
must fail. Otherwise, foreign banking may face difficulty in becoming
established in the United States, thereby thwarting federal efforts to
stimulate foreign trade and investment in this country.94
Under the second theory for determining permissible state action-a
balancing of competing interests--several questions arise. First, who is
to do the balancing? Obviously, when a federal opinion is expressed,
whether by Congress or the Executive, the courts usually are called on
to decide the conflict. When no federal position is stated, the initial
problem of balancing federal and state interests may fall on the state
legislature when it contemplates foreign banking legislation. If the
state legislature is primarily responsible for applying this balancing
test, one must consider whether state authorities ever are capable of

91. See L. HENKIN, supra note 84, at 235-36.
92. 325 U.S. 761 (1945). In Southern Pacific, the Court stated: "Between

these extremes [of what is plainly within and plainly without] lies the infinite
variety of cases, in which regulation of local matters may also operate as a
regulation of commerce, in which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state
and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation
of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved." 325 U.S.
at 768-69.
93. See L. HENKIN, supra note 84, at 236 & n.39.
94. Foreign producers often prefer to have their financing handled by their
bank throughout all steps of the sales process.
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adequately weighing federal interests. " How can state officials
measure the impact of restrictive legislation on the foreign bank
and/or its foreign corporate customers wishing to do business within
the state or other states? A related question is whether state officials
have adequate access to data necessary to determine this impact since
relevant information is usually accessible only to federal authorities.
Additionally, it is doubtful whether the potential loss of trade, even if
measurable by state officials, would be given proper weight by a state
body relatively unconcerned with trade outside its borders. Further
exacerbating the problems inherent in a balancing-of-interests
approach is the State Department's unwillingness to discuss trade
implications with persons outside the Department. In initial stages,
trade agreements require delicate diplomacy that state officials may be
unable or unwilling to provide.
Regardless of which approach to the commerce clause is utilized,
the states will not be allowed to exclude foreign commerce completely
or to favor economic interests by discriminating against out-of-state
commerce. 96 Yet most states either bar or restrict foreign banks,9 7
thereby impeding foreign banking as well as the trade that it could
facilitate. Clearly, then, foreign bank activity is so closely related to
trade with other countries that it should be regulated as foreign
commerce by the federal government.
B. ForeignAffairs Conflict
The conflict between state-imposed restrictions on foreign banking
activity and the federal government's foreign affairs powers is another
factor militating for federal control of foreign banking in the United
States. Twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court, in determining the
breadth of valid state action, was not willing to give a broad
interpretation to federal power in foreign affairs. Thus, in Clark v.
Allen,9" the Court upheld a California statute disallowing nonresident
aliens from inheriting personalty in the United States unless United

95. See Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private
InternationalMatters, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133 (1971). Maier asserts
that a functional analysis is needed-i.e. "whether the matter is best decided by a
national rather than a state decision-maker." Id. at 166.
96. See L. HENKIN, supra note 84, at 236. Discrimination against foreign or
interstate commerce is constitutionally impermissible even when Congress is
silent. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761
(1945).
97. J. ZwicK, supra note 2, at 27.
98. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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States citizens were accorded a reciprocal right by the country of the
heir(s). Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, observed that ".... here
there is no treaty governing the rights of succession to personal
property. Nor has California entered the forbidden domain of
negotiating with a foreign country ... or making a compact with it
contrary to the prohibition of Article 1, § 10 of the Constitution.
What California has done will have some incidental or indirect effect
1
in foreign countries. But that is true of many state laws ....
Apparently, the Court was not impressed with the possibility that
such a state statute runs counter to an implied limitation on state
intrusion into an area of foreign affairs in which the federal
government has not acted.10 Clark, when considered alongside the
earlier case of Hines v. Davidowitz," 1 ' indicated that affirmative
expression by the federal government was required before the Court
could determine whether a state had eclipsed the permissible sphere of
activity involving foreign affairs.
Zschernig v. Miller," 2 however, involving facts substantially similar
to those in Clark, severely curtailed that case's relevance. An Oregon
court, pursuant to state statute, denied an inheritance to an East
German resident on the grounds that the East German was unable to
convince the court (1) that his country would permit United States
citizens to inherit from East German estates or (2) that the East
German Government would not confiscate any inheritance payments
allowed him. In its brief amicus curiae to the Supreme Court, the
State Department pointed out that the federal government was not
contending "that the application of the Oregon escheat statute ...
unduly interferes with the United States' conduct of foreign relations."10" Nevertheless, without expressly overruling Clark, the Court

99. 331 U.S. at 517.
100. L. HENKIN, supra note 84, at 238.
101. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). Davidowitz involved a Pennsylvania statute requiring
registration of aliens. Congress had acted, and the Court found that the state
regulation must fall to the federal one, not necessarily because the Constitution
permits only one uniform system, but because "it cannot be denied that the
Congress might validly conclude that such uniformity is desirable." 312 U.S. at
73. The Court left open the issue whether federal power in this area, exercised or
not, is exclusive. 312 U.S. at 62.
One hundred years earlier, Chief Justice Taney had suggested that the states
could not involve themselves in the foreign relations area of extradition even when
the federal government had not acted. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)

540 (1840).
102. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
103. 389 U.S. at 434.
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held that the statutory demand for reciprocity was "an intrusion by
the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution
entrusts to the President and Congress." ' 4 Justice Douglas, who
authored both the Clark and Zschernig opinions, attempted to
distinguish the two cases by indicating that while Clark was limited to
a review of wording of the statute, the Oregon statute reviewed in
Zschernig required the state court to make inquiry into the applica1 5
tion of foreign laws in addition to analyzing the statutory language.
The distinction is not overly persuasive, since the statutes involved in
the two cases were nearly identical. The problems created in Zschernig
were compounded by the majority's refusal to overrule Clark
expressly. By not doing so, the Court implicitly adopted the three
tests of Clark while failing to clarify the extent of each test or the
weight it should be given. The three tests are: (1) whether the state
action displays an "improper purpose" to influence foreign affairs; (2)
whether the state action actually interfered with federal foreign
policy; (3) whether United States foreign relations have been affected
adversely. By not refining the Clark tests, the Zschernig Court
sidestepped an opportunity to reexamine the scope of valid state
law-making power and left lower courts struggling to determine the
meaning of the Zschernig opinion.
Most cases interpreting the Zschernig opinion have determined that
it proscribes only statutes requiring criticism of foreign governments
by state judges or legislators.'0 6 A state statute that permits foreign
banking on a showing of reciprocal banking privileges granted
American banks"' without requiring the state judge or legislature to

104. 389 U.S. at 432.
105. "We were there concerned with the words of a statute on its face, not the
manner of its application.... State courts, of course, must frequently read,
construe, and apply laws of foreign nations.... At the time Clark v. Allen was
decided, the case seemed to involve no more than a routine reading of foreign
laws. It now appears that in this reciprocity area under inheritance statutes, the
probate courts of various States have launched inquiries into the type of
governments that obtain in particular foreign nations . . . ." 389 U.S. at 433-34.
"The Oregon Statute introduces the concept of 'confiscation,' which is of course
opposed to the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. And this has
led into minute inquiries concerning the exact administration of foreign law .... "
389 U.S. at 435. For a discussion of the constitutional basis of the analysis see L.
HENKIN, supra note 84, at 239 n.51.
106. Maier, supra note 95, at 141. Maier analyzes Zschernig and later related
cases, and offers an effective functional approach to the delineation of federal and
state power.
107. See, e.g., N.Y. BANK. LAW § 202-a (McKinney 1971).
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qualitatively assess the foreign government conceivably might be
upheld. The single aspect of state criticism of foreign governments,
however, cannot be isolated from the impact of foreign banking on
foreign commerce and fiscal policy. The combined effect of these
elements is clearly sufficient to require control at the national level.
Several cases since Zschernig reflect a broad application of
preemption to state activities that may hinder federal policy. °8 The
court in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'r °9 considered
California's "buy American" statute and applied the tests mentioned
in Zschernig to find the statute an unconstitutional encroachment on
the federal government's exclusive power over foreign affairs. Significantly, the court did not base its decision on a conflict between the
California statute and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,"0
but relied on the broader principle that foreign trade problems are
inherently national in scope and cannot be resolved on a state-by-state
basis. Necessarily, the court held that countervailing state policies are
irrelevant when compared with the broad effect of embargoes placed
on foreign products. The case represents an expansion of the
application of the preemption doctrine to state laws that might
detract from federal policy. State regulation of foreign banking
produces precisely the type of obstruction to federal policy that was
deemed prohibited in Bethlehem Steel.
The failure of the Supreme Court to delineate clear tests for
preemption of state law has led to the application of three approaches
to the preemption issue. "' First, the states are prohibited "from
exercising any law making power that interferes with an established
policy being actively carried out by the national government."" ' 2
Secondly, the states may not act so as to have a possible adverse effect
on United States foreign relations. Thirdly, the states should not be
allowed to act when the purpose of the action "is one properly carried

108. See, e.g., Duple Motors Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231 (9th
Cir. 1969) (Ely, J., dissenting); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'r, 276
Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969); South African Airways v. New York
State Div. of Human Rights, 64 Misc. 2d 707, 315 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1970).
109. 276 Cal. App.2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
110. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A3 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
111. Maier, supra note 95, at 151-59. These tests were developed prior to
Zschernig.
112. Id. at 151. Maier persuasively attacks each of the three tests, although he
states that the third comes closest to being an effective tool for identifying the
roles of the states and the nation.
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out by the national government., 113 Each of these approaches
supports the proposition that regulation of foreign banking should be
a function of federal, not state, government.
Under the first approach, state regulations that exclude foreign
banking institutions from certain regions of the United States
discourage the improvement of foreign trade and, therefore, contravene established policy of the federal government.1 14 In addition, the
favorable balance of payments effect accruing from long-term investments by foreign banks in the United States may be impeded by
restrictive state regulations unrelated to a national concern for the
balance of payments. Finally, state control of foreign banks may
enable foreign banking institutions to avoid the full and immediate
impact of United States monetary policy by transferring funds to their
offices in other countries.
A similar conclusion may be reached via the "potential adverse
effect on foreign relations" approach. For example, if a foreign nation
is unhappy because a particular state's foreign banking law requires
reciprocity,' that nation will present its grievance to federal officials
in Washington, not to the state whose law is responsible for the
grievance. The decision-making is thus divorced from the responsibility for dealing with injured nations. If state regulation is not
preempted, the federal government would be rendered powerless to
control those states that may generate foreign protests with which
only it may deal. Furthermore, the effect on foreign relations test
would require the state to make "a judgment concerning the degree of
effect required to invalidate the state action., 116 The difficulty of a
state's making this judgment increases the likelihood of error, leaving
the federal government without an effective recourse other than
positive legislation. 1 7 For example, if a foreign country demanded
complete reciprocity and denied entry to banks of one state because
the foreign country's banks could not enter another American state,
neither the rebuffed state nor the federal government under present
law would have recourse against that state.11
113. Id. at 153-59.
114. See generally Trade Act, supra note 78.
115. New York, the state having the most liberal foreign banking laws, has
such a requirement. See N.Y. BANK. LAW § 202-a (McKinney 1971).
116. Maier, supra note 95, at 154 (emphasis in original).
117. Id.
118. Japan is apparently demanding reciprocity. See THE ECONOMIST, supra
note 5, at 64. One reason why New York drafted its relatively liberal foreign
banking law is that New York-chartered banks encountered difficulty entering
foreign markets. Id. at 64.
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The third approach asks whether the purpose of the state action is
one properly effected only by the national government. This test also
suggests that federal control of foreign banking is appropriate, but the
test is difficult to apply when several purposes are involved, some of
which are properly entertained by state governments.119 States whose
regulations restrict foreign banking activity presumably act to protect
their citizens. But, as was seen in Southern Pacific, this protection
motivation may not be compelling to the Court. Moreover, Zschernig
offers little guidance when both valid and invalid purposes motivate
state action. To compound the problem, state officials having a duty
to weigh purposes and interests may be unable to obtain information
from the State Department about the interests of the federal
government. 120 In any case, the potential adverse effect of state
control of foreign banking on foreign relations, foreign commerce, and
national monetary policy surely outweighs a state's interest in
protecting its citizens who, in all probability, would be adequately
protected from potentially harmful foreign banking practices by
federal regulation.
Recently, a new methodology for analyzing the federal-state
relationship has been proposed. This functional approach assumes that
"the principal determination on which cases in this area should turn is
whether the matter is best decided by a national rather than a state
decision maker.. 21 Three interrelated factors are applied in this
approach: (1) whether the state's limited constituency offers "an
appropriate political context in which to make the required policy
judgment";12 2 (2) whether the state has the necessary information on
which to base its decision; (3) whether the entire nation or only the
particular state will suffer any potentially adverse effects. Applying
each of these factors, it is once again apparent that the regulation of
foreign banking should emanate exclusively from the federal level.

119. See Maier, supra note 95, at 155.
120. Id. at 152. This problem is also faced under the first approach, which
considers whether state action obviates implied federal policies.
121. Id. at 166-68. Maier notes that a functional analysis was early
emphasized in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), and he synthesizes
the approach of the Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964). In Zschernig, preemption was to be judged by federal law.
Sabbatino, however, questioned who would serve as the lawmaker, and the Court
employed a functional analysis based on both the nature of the decision-making
power and the necessity of determining the appropriate decision-making groupi.e. federal judiciary, the President, Congress, or the state government. See Maier,
supra note 95, at 161-62.
122. Maier, supra note 95, at 168.
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First, the state action need not be found unconstitutional under a
specific constitutional provision. Rather, the state action will be
inappropriate whenever the political context of the state actively represents a constituency too narrow to represent effectively the needs of
the entire nation.123 The strained situation arising in 1967 between
Canada and the United States provides a useful example. Canada
denied branch banking to United States banks in Canada; consequently New York denied establishment of more Canadian bank branches
because of a lack of reciprocity, which is required under New York
law. Following prolonged bad relations between Canadian officials and
the United States State Department, Canada statutorily limited
financial activities of foreign-owned subsidiaries. The precipitating
factor to the furor apparently was the First National City Bank's
purchase of the Dutch-owned Mercantile Bank in Canada.12 4 The
misunderstanding might well have been avoided or lessened if the
United States Government had been able to effectively negotiate with
Canadian officials because only a national constituency can properly
gauge the potential adverse effects that one state's actions may have
on other countries and states.
The second factor disallows state action whenever it might interfere
"with a national foreign policy that is not readily identifiable or that
cannot be publicly articulated by the national government for reasons
of international or domestic politics."' 25 Several difficulties posed by
50 potentially different sets of foreign banking rules in the United
States can be avoided by federal regulation. First, trade with foreign
countries must be coordinated at the federal level to insure that the
rights and expectations of the trading countries and third countries are
not infringed; secondly, monetary controls, which are affected by the
balance of payments and international fund transfers by banks, can
operate effectively only on a national level; thirdly, and most
important, it is doubtful that the data necessary to weigh involved
policies could be either obtained or properly analyzed in world
perspective by state decision-makers.
The third factor-the tendency of state rules to affect adversely the
banking ventures of banks of other states-was discussed earlier in
connection with the effect of one state's reciprocity requirement on
126
other states.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Gilbert, supra note 1, at 24.
Maier, supra note 95, at 169.
See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Foreign banking in the United States is no longer a nominal
activity. The assets of foreign bank agencies and branches tripled from
1965 to 1972, increasing to approximately 13 billion dollars. During
this same time, assets of United States banks abroad rose to 75 billion
dollars-an eight-fold increase. 27
Yet, despite this dramatic growth--which surely will continue-the
United States remains the only major country in which foreign
banking is not supervised at the national level. 2 ' No valid constitutional or practical reasons exist to support state control. Although
New York and California, which share the major portion of foreign
banking at the present time, have enjoyed greater prestige as
international financial markets,' 2 9 there is every reason to believe that
a national scheme of regulation of foreign banking would enable other
states throughout the country to benefit from the increased trading
and financing activity that foreign banking could bring. Conversely,
smaller American bankers would not be injured economically by
foreign banking since foreign banks would locate principally in major
cities and would be engaged primarily in facilitating trade between
their home country and the United States.
Moreover, variant state regulations may lead to restrictions on
United States banking abroad. It appears entirely reasonable that a
New York-based bank could be denied expansion in a foreign country
because that nation's banking interests have not been allowed to
penetrate another American state. Such uneven treatment should be
replaced by uniform federal control.
Finally, the lack of federal control has discouraged foreign banking
in the United States, which, in turn, may impede the nation's foreign
commerce policy and activity as well as its monetary controls and
balance of payments efforts.
The present situation seems a result of happenstance:130 foreign
banking remained under state control because the amount of

127. Federal Reserve System Press Release (Feb. 1, 1973).
128. No attempt is made in this note to apply a functional analysis to the
horizontal control conflict at the federal level. Application of analytical
approaches to proposed legislation such as S. 3765, which was proposed by
Senator Javits in 1966, should be profitable. It is suggested that congressional
action in this area under the commerce clause is preferable.
129. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 22.
130. The overlapping authority between state and federal, as well as the
overlap between the three federal regulatory authorities, can be attributed to no
other reason. See Hackley, supra note 3.
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international trade in early years 3 ' was too insignificant to warrant
positive federal intervention. Federal inactivity no doubt has been
aided by lobby pressure from small banks unjustifiably fearful of
increased competition.
At present, the federal government has only limited jurisdiction
over foreign banking in the United States in the form of the Bank
Holding Company Act, which requires the Federal Reserve Board's
approval for foreign bank acquisition of a banking subsidiary in this
country."3 The gross inadequacy of federal control allows a continuing vertical conflict between state and federal control that could
eventually damage national foreign commerce and foreign policy
objectives.
The solution is quite clear and available: Congress should enact
positive legislation to deal with the growing multinational banking
activity. Prior proposals, such as S. 3765,133 introduced by Senator
Javits in 1966 but never enacted, should serve as helpful guidelines.
The codification of liberal federal control over foreign banking
activity will strengthen world trade generally and benefit United
States banks as they negotiate with other sovereigns.
James A. Johnson

131. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 20-21.
132. See notes 50-63 supra and accompanying text. See also Federal Reserve
System Press Release (Feb. 1, 1973).
133. S. 3765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). It should be noted that proposed
bill S. 3765 included a section requiring the Comptroller of the Currency to notify
the State Department of applications to establish an office. The State Department
then would have had 60 days in which to submit its views to the Comptroller on
the desirability of allowing an office to be established. See S. 3765, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 3(b) (1966).
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